01Injection and tool abuse
Content an agent ingests is data, never instruction. Tool surfaces are designed assuming the input is hostile.
XS1 // CYBER · SECURE AI
The agent is part of the attack surface.
An AI system with tool access is privileged infrastructure. XS1 Cyber treats it that way — the same threat modeling applied to any component that can act on production.
02Secret isolation
Credentials live outside agent context and never appear in transcripts, logs, or model output.
03Least-privilege execution
Each capability gets the narrowest credential that completes the task, revocable independently.
04Containment
Execution happens on private nodes with bounded payloads and enforced resource limits.
05Auditability
Every autonomous action carries an actor, a scope, and an outcome that survives the run.
06Model-layer evaluation
Models are evaluated for dangerous-capability behavior and refusal calibration before deployment.
Review checklist
Before an agent system is given privileged access, this division signs off against a fixed checklist.
- 01Threat model covering ingested content, tool calls, and stored memory
- 02Confirmed secret isolation with no path into model context
- 03Least-privilege credentials issued per integration
- 04Approval gates on destructive and externally visible actions
- 05Logging sufficient to reconstruct any run after the fact
- 06A documented way to pause and revoke the system in production
XS1 // CYBER
Secure the environment.
Cybersecurity, defensive systems, secure AI, adversarial research, and cyber operations.